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Abstract
We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare
in a novel axiomatic framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes
between a subjective and an objective source of uncertainty. This framework permits
us to endow the individuals and society not only with ex ante and ex post preferences,
as is classically done, but also with interim preferences of two kinds, and correspond-
ingly, to introduce interim forms of the Pareto principle. After characterizing the ex
ante and ex post criteria, we present a first solution to their conflict that amounts
to extending the former as much possible in the direction of the latter. Then, we
present a second solution, which goes in the opposite direction, and is our preferred
one. This solution combines the ex post criterion with an objective interim Pareto
principle, which avoids the pitfalls of the ex ante Pareto principle, and especially the
problem of ”spurious unanimity” discussed in the literature. Both solutions trans-
late the assumed Pareto conditions into weighted additive utility representations, and
both attribute common individual probability values only to the objective source of
uncertainty.
Keywords: Ex ante social welfare; ex post social welfare; objective versus subjec-
tive uncertainty; Pareto principle; separability; Harsanyi social aggregation theorem;
spurious unanimity.
JEL classification: D70; D81.
1 Introduction
Any normative analysis of collective decisions under uncertainty must confront an old and
unresolved problem: the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare.
This paper proposes a new solution to this problem, based on a distinction between sub-
jective and objective uncertainty. In our framework, agents may hold different probabilistic
∗This research was completed while the first author visited Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin. The second
author was supported by NSERC grant #262620-2008 and by Labex MME-DII (ANR11-LBX-0023-01).
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beliefs about the source of subjective uncertainty, but they must hold the same beliefs
about the objective source. Before explaining this resolution, we must state the conflict in
its classical form, and explain what difference our twofold uncertainty framework makes.
The ex ante social welfare criterion assumes that the individuals form preferences over
social uncertain prospects according to some normative decision theory - typically that of
subjective expected utility (SEU) - and it applies the Pareto principle to these ex ante
individual preferences, thus following an ex ante version of the principle. In contrast, the
ex post social welfare criterion assumes that society itself forms preferences over social
prospects according to the normative decision theory under consideration, while it endows
the individuals only with state-by-state preferences. It then applies the Pareto principle
statewise to these ex post individual preferences, thus following an ex post version of the
principle.1 However, if all agents are subjective expected utility (SEU) maximizers, then
the ex ante and ex post criteria are incompatible. Hence we face a trilemma: we must
abandon either SEU theory, or the ex ante social welfare criterion, or the ex post social
welfare criterion.
This clash between the ex ante and ex post social welfare criteria has long been rec-
ognized, although the problem has been formulated in several different ways. The early
statements by Starr (1973) and Hammond (1981, 1983) belonged to traditional welfare
economics, and envisaged only two extreme solutions to the conflict, i.e., endorsing one
of the two criteria and rejecting the other, with an overall preference for the ex post cri-
terion. Mongin’s (1995) abstract formulation in terms of Savage’s (1972) SEU postulates
avoided the domain-specific assumptions made by the welfare economists, thus sharpening
the conflict, while also bringing out more complex positive solutions. He showed that it was
impossible to satisfy both social welfare criteria and the Savage postulates, unless either
the individual probabilities or the individual utilities exhibit strong dependencies. This
axiomatic approach also facilitated comparison with Harsanyi’s (1955) Social Aggregation
Theorem. This theorem says that, if both individuals and society form their preferences
over social lotteries according to von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) theory, and the social
preferences satisfy the Pareto principle, then society’s preferences can be represented by
a weighted (“utilitarian”) sum of individual utility representations.2 As the Pareto prin-
ciple applies here both ex ante (to lotteries) and ex post (to final outcomes), Harsanyi’s
assumptions contain all the ingredients of the two welfare criteria, and his weighted sum
formula seems to contradict the claim that the two criteria are incompatible. However,
the assumption of a common lottery set amounts to imposing identical probabilities on
all individuals, an extreme case of dependency between individual probabilities, which is
covered by Mongin’s axiomatic treatment. This clarifies the sense in which Harsanyi’s
theorem contributes only to a limiting case of the initial problem.
The present paper will also exploit the fact that the conflict between the ex ante and
1Note the difference between a social welfare criterion and the corresponding Pareto principle. There is
more to the the ex ante (ex post) social welfare criterion than just the ex ante (ex post) Pareto principle,
because a criterion also decides where rationality assumptions apply (to the individuals or society).
2We do not claim that such weighted sums of VNM utilities have a genuine utilitarian interpretation.
Harsanyi took this for granted, but Sen famously denied it, and the debate is still unsettled. See Mongin
and Pivato (2016) for a review, and Fleurbaey and Mongin (2016) for a new defence of Harsanyi’s position.
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ex post social welfare criteria vanishes when probabilities are identical, but in a much more
general fashion than Harsanyi. In our twofold uncertainty framework, if the agents have
probabilistic beliefs at all, these will be the same for the objective source, but may differ
for the subjective source. This amounts to endogenizing Harsanyi’s lottery set assumption
while narrowing down its scope. At the same time, this allows us to partially reconcile the
two welfare criteria, notwithstanding the welfare economists’ pessimistic belief that they are
mutually exclusive. Our framework complies with standard economic methodology, taking
preference relations to be the only primitives. Thus, for both society and the individuals,
we obtain probability and utility functions in the conclusions (not the assumptions) of
our representation theorems. We distinguish between the two sources of uncertainty by
introducing conditional preferences, with different properties. That is, for both society and
the individuals, there will be preferences conditional on the objective source and preferences
conditional on the subjective source, with each kind obeying distinctive decision-theoretic
conditions. This, in turn, leads to two new, interim forms of the Pareto principle, in addition
to the classic ex ante and ex post forms.
Our preferred solution (Theorem 5) mediates between the ex ante and ex post social
welfare criteria as follows. We obtain SEU representations for both the individuals (as
in the ex ante criterion) and society (as in the ex post criterion), which apply to both
the objective and subjective sources of uncertainty. The Pareto principle holds in the ex
post sense, i.e., when all uncertainty is resolved, and also in a limited ex ante sense, i.e.,
when only the objective uncertainty remains to be resolved. We will see that this objective
interim Pareto principle avoids the pitfalls of the full ex ante Pareto principle. Thus, our
solution starts from the ex post social welfare criterion, but also encompasess part of the
ex ante criterion. For the sake of comparison, and to acknowledge a subtle argument of
Hild, Jeffrey and Risse (2003) and Risse (2003), we also introduce another mixed solution
(Theorem 3), which instead starts from the ex ante criterion, and moves towards the ex
post criterion.
Our solutions should be compared with the influential work of Gilboa, Samet and
Schmeidler (2004) (hereafter GSS), which has recently attracted significant attention. In
the same Savage-based framework as Mongin (1995), GSS assume the ex post criterion in
full and the ex ante criterion in part. They limit the ex ante Pareto principle to com-
parisons of social prospects which do not involve probabilistic disagreements between the
individuals. From this, they are able to conclude that (i) society’s ex post preference is
represented by a weighted (“utilitarian”) sum of the individuals’ utility functions, and (ii)
society’s probability equals an average of individual probabilities; this is often called the
linear pooling rule (Genest and Zidek, 1986; Clemen and Winkler, 2007). Importantly,
since GSS weaken the ex ante Pareto principle, they do not conclude that (iii) society’s ex
ante preference can be represented in terms of the individuals’ ex ante representations, let
alone by a weighted sum of them. Thus, they evade the impossibility theorems of Mongin
(1995).
The difference between our solution and that of GSS is as follows. In the twofold
uncertainty framework, we can derive not only (i), but also weighted utility sums for
the conditional social preferences. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, we do not
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obtain (ii), and we see this as an advantage. Often, the individuals have different private
information; in this case, the linear pooling rule can yield the wrong answer. Society
should try to infer this private information from the individual probabilities, rather than
aggregate them mechanically. To illustrate this objection, we provide a simple example
where the GSS solution (and linear pooling in general) is unappealing (Section 5).
If we differ from GSS on both (i) and (ii), this is because of a difference in framework.
We (exogeneously) distinguish between two sources of uncertainty, whereas they (endoge-
neously) distinguish between two kinds of uncertainty, one in which the individuals happen
to agree in their probabilistic values and the other in which they do not. Our exogenous
distinction between objective and subjective uncertainty is related to the distinction made
by Anscombe and Aumann (1963), but they represent objective uncertainty in terms of lot-
teries with known probabilities; in contrast, we do not assume any predefined probabilities,
even for objective uncertainty.
The paper is organized as an ongoing argument. Section 2 introduces the framework,
and the various preference and Pareto conditions. Section 3 axiomatizes the ex ante social
welfare criterion (Proposition 1) and the ex post social welfare criterion (Proposition 2)
in their most general form. Section 4 proposes our first solution, based on the ex ante
criterion (Theorem 3). But Section 5 rejects this solution because of its vulnerability to
spurious unanimity. It also develops the informational objection against the GSS solution
and the linear pooling rule. Section 6 proposes our prefered solution, based on the ex post
criterion (Theorem 5). Finally, Section 7 reviews recent literature.
2 The framework
We assume that states of the world are pairs (s, o), with s representing the subjective
component of the uncertainty, and o the objective component. These components vary
over finite sets S and O with |S| , |O| ≥ 2. Denote by ∆S and ∆O the sets of probability
vectors on S and O respectively. We assume that the individuals i belong to a finite set
I with |I| ≥ 2, and that each individual i and society face uncertain prospects. In the
present framework, these can be completely uncertain (when both s and o are unknown),
subjectively uncertain (o is fixed and s is unknown), or objectively uncertain (s is fixed and
o is unknown). We think of social prospects in the usual way, as mappings from states
to social consequences, but with social consequences directly expressed in terms of payoff
numbers for the individuals. We leave it for the interpretation to decide whether these
numbers represent physical payoffs (levels of consumption in a good) or subjective payoffs
(utility values in some metric).
Denoting the payoff numbers by xiso, we define completely uncertain prospects as follows:
for an individual i ∈ I, they are matrices Xi = (xiso)s∈S,o∈O ∈ RS×O, and for society, they
are three-dimensional arrays, X = (xiso)i∈Is∈S,o∈O ∈ RI×S×O.3 Other prospects are obtained
by fixing one dimension of the state in these objects. Hence objectively uncertain prospects
3The order in which s and o, or S and O, enter the notation is purely conventional. We do not mean
to suggest that the s-uncertainty is resolved before the o-uncertainty.
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(resp. subjectively uncertain prospects) are, for individual i, vectors xis = (x
i
so)o∈O ∈ RO
for some fixed s ∈ S (resp. xio = (xiso)s∈S ∈ RS for some fixed o ∈ O ), and for society,
matrices Xs = (x
i
so)
i∈I
o∈O ∈ RI×O (resp. Xo = (xiso)i∈Is∈S ∈ RI×S). Notice that it is the
unresolved uncertainty that fixes the status of these prospects; thus, an objective prospect
is one in which o is unknown and s known, and vice-versa for a subjective prospect. When
uncertainty is completely resolved, an individual i faces a scalar xiso, while society faces a
vector xso = (x
i
so)
i∈I ∈ RI .
We assume that both the individuals and society assess completely uncertain prospects
in terms of ex ante preference relations, denoted by %i for i ∈ I and % for society; these are
our only preference primitives. Throughout, we take them to be continuous weak orders,
thus representable by continuous real-valued utility functions.
The other relations of this paper are conditionals induced by either the %i or %. There
are six of them to consider: %is, %io and %iso for individual i, and %s, %o and %so for
society. While %iso and %so make ex post comparisons, %is, %s, %io and %o make interim
comparisons, which are specific to our twofold uncertainty framework. We obtain these
conditional preferences by restricting the unconditional preferences to prospects that vary
only along the component of interest. For instance, for all i in I and s in S, the relation
%is compares prospects xis ∈ RO in the same way as %i compares those larger prospects
Xi ∈ RS×O in which all S-components other than s are fixed at some arbitrary values.
Likewise, %o compares prospects Xo ∈ RI×S in the same way as % compares those larger
prospects X = (xiso)i∈Is∈S,o∈O ∈ RI×S×O in which all O-components other than o are fixed at
some arbitrary values.
Importantly, a conditional relation defined in this way is complete, but not necessarily
transitive, so it is not necessarily an ordering. A special assumption must be added to endow
it with this property, separability, which says the comparisons made by the unconditional
relation are the same, independent of the arbitrary values used to define the conditional.
This idea is familiar from decision theory, but we review it in Appendix A.
The individual ex post relations %iso simply compare real numbers according to their
natural ordering. This is consistent with our payoff interpretation of these numbers, and
means that %iso is automatically transitive. Formally, for all (s, o) ∈ S × O, all i ∈ I and
all xiso, y
i
so ∈ R, we stipulate that
xiso %iso yiso if and only if xiso ≥ yiso. (1)
For all the other conditional relations, we do not assume transitivity in general. If (and
only if) a relation is transitive, we will call it a preference. Thus, when we say below that %i
or % induces an ex post or interim preference, we mean a (transitive) preference ordering,
which amounts to assuming that %i or % is separable in the relevant component. Whenever
we assume that a conditional relation is a preference, we will make this assumption across
the uncertainty type. In other words, we take the ordering property of conditionals to hold
either for all (s, o) or for none, for all s or for none, and for all o or for none. Thus, we will
simply say, “%i induces interim preferences %is” or “% induces ex post preferences %so”,
without adding the implied “for all s” or “for all (s, o)”.4
4The requirement that separability conditions hold across the uncertainty type means that they are
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When %i or % induces conditional preferences of some type, we may, by a separate
decision, require that these preferences be identical across this type. For example, we may
assume not only that %i induces interim %is preferences, but also that %is= %is′ for all
s, s′ ∈ S; and we may assume not only that % induces ex post preferences %so, but also
that%so =%s′o′ for all s, s′ ∈ S and o, o′ ∈ O. We will then say that the induced preferences
are invariant. Note that the %iso preferences are automatically invariant, by statement (1).
Our framework should be compared with Savage’s (1972) axiomatization of SEU. When
we say that %i or % induces conditional preferences of some type, we are in effect applying
the Sure-thing Principle - (P2) in Savage’s system - but in a limited form. Similarly, the
optional requirement that ex post or interim preferences are invariant corresponds to the
event-independent preference condition - (P3) in Savage’s system - but again in limited
form.5 We would recover the entirety of the Sure-thing Principle if we required all induced
conditionals to be preferences, and we would recover the entirety of the event-independent
preference condition if we required all these induced preferences to be invariant, but we
will refrain from doing that because - as will be explained - this would precipitate the same
kind of impossibilities as those obtained for the Savage framework, and we are here are
after positive solutions.
Our framework should also be compared with Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) variant
of Savage’s theory, in which the consequences of prospects take the form of VNM lotteries.6
Like them, we exogenously distinguish an objective and subjective source of uncertainty.
However, unlike them, we locate this distinction within each state and not between the
consequences and the states; we do not assume that the objective source already has
probabilities attached to it, but derive this property axiomatically; and we are concerned
with multiple decision-makers, so that we can associate the objective and subjective sources
with shared and idiosyncratic probabilities, respectively.
In the standard uncertainty framework, social preference is subjected to Pareto condi-
tions defined either ex ante or ex post. But the twofold uncertainty framework introduces
more options. Now, the ex ante condition applies to completely uncertain prospects, the ex
post condition applies to fully resolved prospects, and two newly defined interim conditions
apply to s-resolved prospects and o-resolved prospects. Formally:
 satisfies the ex ante Pareto principle if for all X,Y ∈ RI×S×O:
if Xi  i Yi for all i ∈ I, then X  Y; if, in addition, Xi i Yi for some
i ∈ I, then X  Y.
 satisfies the ex post Pareto principle if for all (s, o) ∈ S ×O, and all x, y ∈ RI :
if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ I, then x  so y; if, in addition, xi > yi for some i ∈ I,
then x so y;
equivalent to dominance conditions for the given type. See Appendix A for details.
5In a framework with a finite number of states, a state-independent preference condition is sufficient to
do the work of (P3), which is to determine a probability representation. See, e.g., Karni’s (2014) review
of SEU theories.
6For a recent extension of Anscombe and Aumann’s theorem, see Mongin and Pivato (2015).
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 satisfies the objective interim Pareto principle if for all s ∈ S:
if xis  is yis for all i ∈ I, then Xs  Ys; if in addition, xis is yis for some
i ∈ I, then Xs  Ys.
The interim Pareto principle introduced here is called objective, because it handles prospects
in which the only uncertainty concerns the objective source . We likewise define the sub-
jective interim Pareto principle, which interchanges the roles of the two sources, thus
considering subjective prospects with fixed o and uncertain s. Notice that all forms of the
Pareto principle except for the ex ante one are defined in terms of binary relations rather
than preferences (orderings). This is to make the Paretian conditions logically independent
of the decision-theoretic assumptions. However, in our conclusions, any time a version of
the Pareto principle holds, it applies to preferences, not just relations.
3 The ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare
The first result of this section axiomatically characterizes the ex ante social welfare crite-
rion. This is done by assuming the ex ante Pareto principle plus relevant decision-theoretic
conditions on individual preferences. Specifically, we require that each individual have well-
defined invariant interim preferences for either type of uncertainty. Although this is weaker
than Savage’s postulates, it turns out to deliver full-fledged SEU representations for the
individuals. By contrast, the ex ante social preference is simply represented by a function
that is increasing with these individual representations.
Proposition 1 Suppose that for all i ∈ I, the individual preference i induces interim
preferences of both kinds, i.e., is and io, and both kinds are invariant. Suppose also that
 satisfies the ex ante Pareto principle. Then, for all i ∈ I, there are strictly positive
probability vectors pi ∈ ∆S and qi ∈ ∆O, and an increasing continuous utility function ui
on R, such that the preference ordering i admits the following SEU representation:
Ui(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
qiop
i
su
i(xso), for all X ∈ RS×O. (2)
Moreover, there is a continuous increasing function F on the range of the vector-valued
function (U i)i∈I such that  is represented by the ex ante social welfare function
Wxa(X) := F (
[
U i(Xi)
]
i∈I), for all X ∈ RI×S×O. (3)
In these representations, for all i ∈ I, the probability vectors pi and qi are unique, and ui is
unique up to positive affine transformations, while F is unique up to continuous increasing
transformations.
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Each SEU representation U i builds upon two probability functions pi and qi, which
we can interpret as i’s subjective beliefs about S and O, respectively. The multiplicative
probability qio p
i
s then means that i believes that S and O are probabilistically independent.
But our symmetric treatment of the two types of conditional preferences does not yet
permit us to distinguish S from O.
The second result of this section axiomatizes the ex post social welfare criterion. Thus,
we take the ex post Pareto principle to be the only unanimity condition, and reserve the
decision-theoretic conditions for society. The conclusions reproduce those of Proposition 1
mutatis mutandis. They deliver a SEU representation for social preference and make the
ex post social welfare function increasing in the individual ex post utilities.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the social preference  induces interim preferences of both
kinds, i.e., s and o, and both kinds are invariant. Suppose also that  satisfies the ex
post Pareto principle. Then, social ex post preferences so are well-defined and invariant,
and there is a continuous and increasing representation Wxp for these preferences. There
also exist strictly positive probability vectors p ∈ ∆S and q ∈ ∆O such that  has the
following SEU representation:
Wxa(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
psqoWxp(xso), for all X ∈ RI×S×O. (4)
In this representation, p and q are unique, and the ex post social welfare function Wxp is
unique up to positive affine transformations.
The probabilities p and q that appear here - again in multiplicative form - belong to
society exclusively. Those of the individuals - if any - are left unspecified, since the only
individual data are the orderings i and iso, nothing being said on the other conditionals.
As in Proposition 1, our symmetric treatment of S and O does not yet make it possible to
separate the interpretation of the two sources of uncertainty.
The main results of this paper will exploit the twofold uncertainty framework in order
to reconcile the two social welfare criteria. We will consider two intermediary solutions in
turn, one based on the ex ante criterion (in Section 4), and the other based on the ex
post criterion (in Section 6, our preferred solution). In both cases , we include as much as
possible of the other criterion, pushing the reconciliation to the point where any further
step would precipitate an impossibility.
4 An initial reconciliation of ex ante and ex post
Our first main result starts from the ex ante social welfare criterion, and extends it to
recover as much of the ex post criterion as possible.
Theorem 3 Suppose the same assumptions as in Proposition 1 hold, and moreover, the
social preference  induces interim preferences of both kinds, i.e., s and o, with the
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interim preferences o being invariant. Then, for all i ∈ I, the SEU representations of
Proposition 1 for ex ante individual preferences hold with q1 = ... = qn = q, i.e., for all
i ∈ I, we have
U i(X) =
∑
o∈O
∑
s∈S
qop
i
su
i(xso), for all X ∈ RS×O.
Furthermore, the ex ante social preference  is now represented by the additive ex ante
social welfare function
Wxa(X) :=
∑
i∈I
Ui =
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
qop
i
su
i(xiso), for all X ∈RI×S×O, (5)
and, for all states (s, o) ∈ S × O,  induces a state-dependent ex post social preference
so represented by
Wso(X) :=
∑
i∈I
pisu
i(xiso), for all x ∈ RI .
The interim social preferences s and o are represented by the relevant sums in the
formula for Wxa. As a consequence, the ex post and objective interim forms of the Pareto
principle also hold.
In these representations, q and each pi are unique, while the utility functions ui are
unique up to a positive affine transformation with a common multiplier.
Theorem 3 strengthens Proposition 1 in several ways. First of all, the individuals’ SEU
representations now separate the two sources of uncertainty as they should: each can
entertain an idiosyncratic probability vector pi on the subjective source, but must accept
the common probability vector q on the objective source. By requiring society, like the
individuals, to have invariant interim preferences on the objective source, we have not only
endowed society with a probability vector q, but also forced the individuals to coordinate
their probabilities of this source on q. Unlike them, society has interim preferences on the
subjective source that may not be invariant. Hence, no social probability exists for this
source, a prominent feature of Theorem 3.
Second, Theorem 3 turns the unspecified social welfare function Wxa of Proposition
1 into a weighted sum of the individuals’ expected utilities, as in Harsanyi’s (1955) So-
cial Aggregation Theorem. However, we derive the identity of probabilistic beliefs that
he merely assumed, and we restrict this identity to the objective source of uncertainty.
Additive representations exist for all the social preferences, but with distinctive properties.
The representations of the interim social preferences %o:∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
pisu
i(xiso)
are independent of o, but both the representations of the ex post social preferences so:∑
i∈I
pisu
i(xiso),
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and of the interim social preferences s:∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
qop
i
su
i(xiso)
depend on the value of s. To assume such state-dependence of society’s preferences is
one way of reconciling the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare (Mongin, 1998;
Chambers and Hayashi, 2006). In a standard SEU framework, this solution leaves society
without any probabilistic beliefs, and some have objected to it for this reason. Theorem
3 combines social state-dependence for subjective uncertainty with a well-defined social
probability for objective uncertainty.
Third, beside more fully determining the ex ante social welfare criterion, Theorem 3
includes as much as possible of the ex post social welfare criterion. As the next corollary
demonstrates, slightly stronger assumptions would deliver a social probability p on the
subjective source, but also force the individuals to align their probabilities pi on p, an un-
acceptable conclusion since they may hold different beliefs about S. This is an adaptation
of Mongin’s (1995) impossibility theorem to the twofold uncertainty framework.
Corollary 4 Suppose the same assumptions as in Theorem 3 hold, and moreover, the
social preference % induces invariant interim preferences %s. Then, the representations of
Theorem 3 hold with a common probability vector p ∈ ∆S such that p1 = ... = pn= p.
Theorem 3 is a welcome improvement on the position in welfare economics that merely
adopts the ex ante criterion and rejects the ex post one. Among the more recent participants,
Hild, Jeffrey and Risse (2003) and Risse (2003) have made a subtle case for the ex ante
Pareto principle against the ex post one. In effect, they argue that social and individual
preferences are always ex ante. The distinction between final consequences and uncertain
prospects is a matter of convention; a more refined analysis of these consequences and their
underlying events would reveal that they define yet another class of uncertain prospects. By
focusing on this particular class, the ex post Pareto principle makes an arbitrary restriction
to the ex ante principle, while being open to exactly the same difficulties; hence it should
be avoided. This troubling argument connects with worries that Savage once expressed on
the relevance of his framework.7 We will return to it in Section 6.
However, we will now raise an objection that even Hild, Jeffrey and Risse concede
regarding the ex ante Pareto principle, i.e., spurious unanimity, an objection introduced
by Mongin (1997). The next section illustrates this with an idealized public policy example.
5 Spurious unanimity and complementary ignorance
Imagine the members of society are spread out in two areas, an island and a mainland,
with the island being rich, sparsely populated, and beautifully preserved, and the mainland
7See Savage’s (1972) analysis of “small worlds” and the problem they raise for his SEU theory.
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being poor, densely populated, and disfigured by industrialization. Being worried that the
island is lacking sufficient public services and the mainland is lacking recreation areas, the
Government considers connecting one to the other by a bridge, and being democratically
inspired, it organizes a public hearing. Given the relatively high toll that will have to be
paid by users of the bridge, it is not clear whether the flow will go from the little populated
but rich island, or from the heavily populated but poorer mainland. (But we assume that
the bridge is financially feasible, whichever the direction of the main flow of users.) As
it happens, the Islanders think that the former consequence is more probable than the
latter, while the Mainlanders have the opposite belief. (To connect this assumption with
Theorem 3, we take the direction of the flow to be subjectively, not objectively uncertain;
formally, it is evaluated by the pis, not the q0.) It is also the case that both communities are
self-concerned, so that the Islanders value the former consequence more than the latter,
while the Mainlanders have the opposite preference. Given these data, SEU and even
more general decision theories predict that the two groups will both support the project. As
the well-intended Government takes the Pareto principle very seriously, it will push the
project forward. However, this would be a dubious decision to make. The two groups are
unanimous in preferring the bridge, but spuriously, since they are in fact twice opposed - i.e.,
in their utility and probability comparisons - and their disagreements just cancel out in the
SEU or related calculation. Arguably, the Government should go beyond the individuals’
overt preferences and clarify the beliefs and desires underlying these preferences, and if
the individuals disagree on these two scores, as is the case here, it should conclude that
unanimity does not compel it to build the bridge.8
Our diagnosis of the bridge example rests on a normative claim. Individual judgments
do not matter to society by themselves, but in virtue of the reasons that individuals have for
holding them; accordingly, society should take these reasons into account before deciding
whether unanimous individual judgments are compelling or not; and in particular, if the
individuals strongly disagree on each set of reasons separately considered, society does
not have to follow suit. The last case - deep disagreement below a surface agreement -
is spurious unanimity, as defined by Mongin (1997). He applies this analysis to social
decision under uncertainty as a particular case; here the judgments are preferences over
prospects, and the reasons are beliefs about the states and utilities for the consequences.
As the ex ante Pareto principle only considers prospects, not consequences or states, it
does not discriminate between spurious and nonspurious cases of unanimous preferences.
This argument suggests giving up the principle, but not necessarily entirely, since it does
not deny that there may be a valid core of ex ante unanimity.
Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2004) were the first to argue for a restriction rather
than an abandonment of ex ante Pareto .9 They restrict the ex ante Pareto principle to
comparisons of social prospects in which the events of interest receive the same probability
values across all individuals. Formally, they introduce the family F of all events on whose
8Mathematically equivalent examples of spurious unanimity can be constructed in terms of a proposed
financial transaction between two speculative traders, a proposed treaty between two countries, or a
proposed deal (or duel) between two gentlemen.
9From the spurious unanimity objection, Mongin (1997, 1998) moves all the way to the ex post solution.
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probabilities all individuals agree;10 then they limit ex ante Pareto to comparisons between
social prospects that are measurable with respect to F . An example is a social prospect
which is constant on the cells of a partition, where each cell receives the same probabilities
from all individuals. GSS’s restriction of ex ante Pareto is tailor-made to block the “bridge”
example, since it precludes probabilistic disagreement from cancelling utility disagreement.
Thus, it seems to purge the ex ante Pareto principle of its spurious applications.
However, GSS’s solution can go wrong in situations where the individuals have private
information. Consider a society of two individuals, Alice and Bob, a partitition of the set
of states S into three events E1, E2, E3, and two prospects, f and g, which we describe
in terms of the utility values that each of the three events brings to Alice and Bob. We
assume that they share the same utility function, and initially have the same probabilistic
beliefs, as shown in the next table.
E1 E2 E3
Alice’s and Bob’s utilities for f 1 0 1
Alice’s and Bob’s utilities for g 0 1 0
Alice’s and Bob’s probabilities 0.49 0.02 0.49
Initially, Alice and Bob both assign an SEU of 0.98 to f and an SEU of 0.02 to g, so that
they both prefer f over g. Thus, GSS’s restricted ex ante Pareto principle says that society
should also prefer f over g.
Suppose now that Alice privately observes the event E1 ∪ E2, while Bob privately
observes the event E2 ∪E3. After Bayesian updating, they have the following probabilities
and SEU values:
P (E1) P (E2) P (E3) SEU(f) SEU(g)
Alice 0.96 0.04 0 0.96 0.04
Bob 0 0.04 0.96 0.96 0.04
From this table, we construct the family F of events on the probabilities of which Alice and
Bob agree. Both put P (E1 ∪ E3) = 0.96 and P (E2) = 0.04, so F = {∅, E1 ∪ E3, E2,S}.
The prospects f and g are constant on E1∪E3 and constant on E2, hence measurable with
respect to F , so GSS’s restricted ex ante Pareto principle says that that f should be socially
preferred to g. However, if the bearer of social preference learns that Alice has observed
E1 ∪ E2, and Bob has observed E2 ∪ E3, he should logically conclude that E2 is the true
event. But then g should socially be preferred to f , contrary to the previous conclusion.
Alice and Bob unanimously prefer f over g only because each one has information the
other one lacks; they are in a state of complementary ignorance.
This criticism applies not only to the restricted ex ante Pareto principle of GSS, but to
the linear pooling rule itself. Regardless of the weights for Alice’s and Bob’s probabilities
in this rule, the common probability value P (E2) = 0.04 is also the social probability
value. When presented in this way, the example becomes of interest to the management
literature, where linear pooling has acquired somewhat canonical status. 11
10Note that F might not be an algebra, let alone a σ-agebra of events.
11See the related urn example against the linear pooling rule in Mongin (1997). In this example, the
social observer infers what each individual has observed just by being told the revised probability values.
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At this point, the reader might object that neither the ex ante Pareto principle nor
the GSS restriction was ever intended to cover the case of changing information. In other
words, both are stated under the implicit proviso that the individuals’ probabilities are
priors, unlike the probabilities of the last tables, which are posteriors. However, the dis-
tinction between “prior” and “posterior” is just a matter of convention. Depending on
what one considers to be background knowledge and what one calls new information, what
is called a prior in one context would be called a posterior in another. Leaving aside “orig-
inal position” or “veil of ignorance” constructions, the individual probabilities of interest
to society are always already posteriors. The only relevant distinction is between those
posteriors which can be analyzed so as to reveal information, as in the Alice and Bob
example, and those which cannot. The linear pooling rule obliterates this distinction.12
As discussed in Section 7, some authors find GSS’s Pareto principle too weak, arguing
that ex ante unanimity is sometimes compelling even in cases of probabilistic disagreement.
But our example of complementary ignorance suggests, to the contrary, that GSS’s Pareto
principle is still too strong. The next section explores our prefered alternative.
6 A final reconciliation of ex ante and ex post
At this point, it is clear that any social decision criterion must achieve three goals: first,
avoid the impossibility theorems discussed in the introduction; second, avoid the problem
of spurious unanimity (unlike the ex ante-based solution of Theorem 3), and third, avoid
the problem of complementary ignorance (unlike the solution of GSS). Within these con-
straints, we should maximize the utility information that can be derived from the axioms.
Theorem 5 below is our solution to this problem. Reversing the direction taken in Theorem
3, it starts from the ex post criterion, and exploits the double uncertainty framework to
recover as much as possible of the ex ante criterion. What it retains from the latter are, for
one thing, the decision-theoretic assumptions relative to the individuals, and for another,
the objective interim Pareto principle.
Theorem 5 Suppose the same assumptions as in Proposition 2 hold, and moreover, for all
i ∈ I, the individual preferences i induces invariant interim preferences is and invariant
interim preferences io. Suppose also that the objective interim Pareto principle holds.
Then, there exist strictly positive probability vectors p ∈ ∆S and q ∈ ∆O, and for all i ∈ I,
there exist probability vectors pi ∈ ∆S and continuous and increasing utility functions ui,
such that the following holds. For all i ∈ I, the relation i has the SEU representation:
U i(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
pis qo u
i(xso), for all X ∈RS×O, (6)
while the SEU representation of  in Proposition 2 holds, that is,
Wxa(X) =
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
ps qoWxp(xso), for all X ∈ RI×S×O. (7)
12“Original position” or “veil of ignorance” in the style of Harsanyi and Rawls are usually interpreted
as referring to pure priors. However, some recent variants allow for private information (Nehring, 2004;
Chambers and Hayashi, 2014).
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Furthermore, there is a vector of positive weights r = (ri)i∈I such that the ex post social
welfare function Wxp has the additive form
Wxp(x) :=
∑
i∈I
ri ui(xi), for all x ∈ RI . (8)
Finally, for all s ∈ S and o ∈ O, the interim social preferences s and o have the
representations:∑
o∈O
qoWxp(xo), for all X ∈ RO, and
∑
s∈S
psWxp(xs), for all X ∈ RS . (9)
In these representations, the vectors p, q and r are unique, and the utility functions (ui)i∈I
are unique up to positive affine representations with a common multiplier.
As with Theorem 3, let us compare the conclusions with those of the base-line statement,
here Proposition 2. First, while Proposition 2 said nothing of the decision theory satisfied
by the individuals, we now see that they have SEU representations for their preferences
i. These representations break the symmetry between the two sources of uncertainty
in the sensible way , by endowing the individuals with identical probabilities on O and
idiosyncratic probabilities on S. Theorem 3 also broke the symmetry, but by using the
questionable ex ante Pareto principle.
Second, all available Pareto conditions are translated into weighted sum formulas for
social preferences. That is, the ex post social utility Wxp, which Proposition 2 did not
determine, turns out to be a weighted sum of ex post individual utilities, and one can also
check that, for each given s, the objective interim social welfare function∑
o∈O
qoWxp(xo)
can be rewritten as a weighted sum of the individuals’ objective interim expected utilities:∑
i∈I
ri
∑
o∈O
qo u
i(xso).
By contrast, no such translation exists for the subjective interim social utilities and the
ex ante social utility, which reflects the absence of subjective interim or ex ante Pareto
hypotheses. Of course, replacing Wxp(x) by its value in the SEU formulas for these two
social utilities delivers weighted sums of ui values, but since society uses its own proba-
bility p, not the individual probabilities pi, what is being added are not individual SEU
representations.
Third, as with Theorem 3, any further step towards the ex ante Pareto criterion pre-
cipitates an impossibility. Indeed, adding either the ex ante Pareto principle in full or even
just the subjective interim Pareto principle collapses all individual probabilities onto the
social ones. Formally:
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Corollary 6 Suppose the same assumptions as in Theorem 5 hold. Suppose also that, for
all s ∈ S, %s satisfies the subjective interim Pareto principle. Then, on top of the previous
results, for all i ∈ I, pi = p, and as a consequence, the ex ante Pareto principle holds.
Thus, Theorem 5 maximizes the utility information that can be derived within the
three constraints stated above. By deriving idiosyncratic probabilities on the subjective
source, it circumvents the impossibilities, and by imposing common probabilities on the
objective source, it becomes immune to spurious unanimity. Perhaps most importantly,
regarding the subjective source, it derives no connection between the social probability and
the individual ones, and in particular eschews the linear pooling rule. (For a quick check
that this does not hold, notice that the axioms can be satisfied for any choice of ui with
all pi being the same and nonetheless differing from p.)
By comparison with Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2004), Theorem 5 enriches con-
clusion (i), while discarding (ii). Theorem 5 can also be related to the argument of Hild,
Jeffrey and Risse (2003). They end up endorsing the full ex ante principle only because
their classical SEU framework compels them to choose between it and the rival ex post one.
In a richer framework in which this dichotomy is superseded, their argument (that so-called
ex post preferences are ex ante preferences in disguise) should rather lead one to reconcile
the two welfare criteria, and indeed our objective interim Pareto principle provides one
such reconciliation.
7 Related literature
The conflict between the ex ante and ex post social welfare criteria has attracted renewed
attention since Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2004). The general strategy is to weaken
either the ex ante Pareto principle, or the SEU assumptions (whether on society or the
individuals), while preserving the ex post Pareto principle. Employing the first strategy ,
Nehring (2004) and Chambers and Hayashi (2014) have found a new impossibility theorem .
They assume that agents have private information, and restrict the ex ante Pareto principle
to situations where it is common knowledge that one prospect ex ante Pareto-dominates
another. If society satisfies statewise dominance, even this restricted variant leads to an
undesirably strong conclusion: the agents must share a common prior on the common
knowledge events. Chambers and Hayashi further show that ex ante social welfare is a
weighted sum of individual expected utilities, whereas Nehring assumes this. These results
refine those of Harsanyi (1955) and Mongin (1995).
Others use both strategies at the same time. For example, Qu (2016) considers the
possibility that both society and the individuals conform to the maximin expected utility
(MEU) theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), a generalization of SEU where each agent
is described by a set of probabilistic beliefs. Since Qu operates in the Anscombe and
Aumann (1963) framework, which draws an exogenous distinction between objective and
subjective uncertainty, he can deploy a Pareto principle for objective uncertainty that bears
some analogy with ours. He also restricts the ex ante Pareto principle to a Common Taste
version, which regulates comparisons between prospects f and g only when the individuals
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have unanimous ex post preferences over every possible outcome arising from f or g, with
comparisons being performed on the certainty equivalents of such prospects (or convex
combinations thereof). Qu shows that society satisfies his two Pareto principles if and
only if the ex post social welfare is a weighted sum of individual utilities and the social
set of probabilities P is a convex combination of the individuals’ sets. The first conclusion
is identical to conclusion (i) of GSS, and the second generalizes their conclusion (ii). In
a variant that replaces MEU by the even more general Choquet expected utility (CEU) of
Schmeidler (1989), Qu derives (i) again, as well as an appropriate generalization of (ii).
Alon and Gayer (2016) assume Savage’s SEU theory for the individuals, and put axioms
on society that endow it with a MEU representation. They strengthen GSS’s restricted ex
ante Pareto principle to a Consensus Pareto version, which says that if every individual
(according to his own probabilistic beliefs) deems that prospect f yields a higher SEU
than prospect g for every individual, then society should prefer f over g. This excludes
the spurious unanimity diagnosed by Mongin (1997), while still respecting unanimity in
some situations where individuals have different beliefs. Alon and Gayer show that society
satisfies Consensus Pareto if and only if conclusion (i) holds and the social probability set
is included in the convex hull of the individual probability measures.
In the Anscombe-Aumann framework, Danan et al. (2016) suppose that society and
each individual have partial orders  and i that admit representations in the sense of
Bewley (2002), i.e., there are sets P and Pi of probability distributions such that f  g
(resp. f i g) if and only if f yields at least as high an expected utility as g according to
all elements in P (resp. in Pi). The authors refer to these partial orders as unambiguous
preference relations and show that those of society satisfy an ex ante Pareto principle
relative to those of the individuals if and only if conclusion (i) holds, and P is included in
the intersection of the Pi. In the particular case of SEU theory, the individuals’ unique
probability measure is the same for all individuals and society, which also satisfies SEU
theory; this recovers Mongin’s (1995) impossibility theorem in the Anscombe-Aumann
framework. Danan et al. also consider Common Taste Pareto and show that society’s
unambiguous preference relation satisfies this condition if and only if (i) holds, and P
is included in the convex hull of the unions of the Pi. They also provide a solution to
an impossibility theorem of Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud (2008), in which a society of
ambiguity-sensitive agents is susceptible to a phenomenon of spurious hedging, analogous
spurious unanimity. 13
The positive results in the three aforementioned papers have many attractive features,
but they are all vulnerable to the problem of complementary ignorance from Section 5.
In that example, both individuals satisfy SEU theory, which is a special case of the MEU
and Bewley theories (using a singleton set of probabilities) as well as CEU theory (since
a probability is a capacity). But in this case, the results of these three papers force the
observer to be an SEU maximizer, with probabilistic beliefs given by the linear pooling
rule, which, as we have seen, does not properly incorporate private information. Indeed, in
our example in Section 5, both agents had the same utility function. Thus, the Consensus
13This is explained most clearly in the preprint version (Danan et al., 2015) .
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Pareto axiom of Alon and Gayer (2016) and the common taste Pareto axioms of Qu (2016)
and Danan et al. (2016) all reduce to ex ante Pareto, which yields the wrong answer in
that example.
Billot and Vergopoulos (2016) have devised a framework in which neither spurious
unanimity nor complementary ignorance can arise. They endow each individual with a
personalized state space and a personalized consequence set, and society with a state space
and a consequence set that are simply Cartesian products of these spaces. Assuming SEU
theory for individuals and society, Billot and Vergopoulos show that the latter satisfies a set
of three Pareto conditions if and only if (i) holds and the social probability measure is the
product of the individual ones, an interesting alternative to (ii). To adopt this framework is
tantamount to assuming that individuals face independent risks, as in standard insurance
markets, an assumption that works for some public policy applications, but not for all. In
the bridge example of Section 5, the risk faced by the Islanders is not independent of the
risk faced by the Mainlanders.
Complementing these axiomatic endeavours, other papers usefully investigate the same
issues in relation to financial markets. Standard economic theory generally endorses trans-
actions on these markets by assuming the ex ante Pareto principle, but uncertainty raises
spurious unanimity objections here as it does elsewhere. Thus, Posner and Weyl (2013),
Blume et al. (2015) and others identify purely speculative transactions with those driven
by different beliefs, and argue for public regulation in this case. Defining a new form of
Paretian comparison, Gilboa, Samuelson and Schmeidler (2014) say that prospect f No-
Betting Pareto (NBP) dominates prospect g if there exists some probability measure p
such that f yields at least as high an expected utility as g for every agent, according to
p. They show that NBP-dominance holds if and only if, for any weighted sum of ex post
utilities, g does not statewise dominate f . They explore the consequences for financial
markets of restricting the ex ante Pareto principle to NBP-dominance comparisons, an
analysis continued by Gayer et al. (2014). But NBP is still vulnerable to the problem of
complementary ignorance.
Instead of Pareto dominance, Brunnermeier, Simsek and Xiong (2014) strengthen the
concept of Pareto inefficiency, by defining a prospect f to be belief-neutral inefficient if,
for every probability measure p arising from a convex combination of the individual ones,
there is some prospect yielding a higher p-expected utility for every agent than f . They
propose to use this criterion to identify speculative transactions, and recommend regulatory
scrutiny for these. They also propose a second criterion, which is based on a utilitarian-
style social welfare function, and is related to the Bewley preferences considered by Danan
et al. (2016). Like the authors cited in the previous paragraph, they argue forcefully and
convincingly that unrestricted speculation in financial markets can destroy social welfare.
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Appendices
Appendix A states general lemmas and propositions about separability. Appendix B uses
these reuslts to prove the results in the paper.
Appendix A: Technical background
We begin by restating the definition of a conditional relation in terms of its master relation,
and the separability property that turns a conditional relation into an ordering.
Suppose that a weak preference ordering R is defined on a product set X =∏`∈LX`,
where L is a finite set of indexes. Take a subset of indexes J ⊆ L and its complement
K := L\J . Denote the subproduct sets∏`∈J X` and∏`∈KX` by XJ and XK, respectively.
By definition, the conditional induced by R on J is the relation RJ on XJ thus defined:
for all ξJ , ξ
′
J ∈ XJ ,
ξJ RJ ξ
′
J if and only if for some ξK ∈ XK, (ξJ , ξK) R (ξ′J , ξK).
We denote the conditional R{`} by R`. By a well-known fact, the conditional RJ is an
ordering if and only if R is separable in J , that is: for all ξJ , ξ′J ∈ XJ and ξK, ξ′K ∈ XK,
(ξJ , ξK) R (ξ
′
J , ξK) if and only if (ξJ , ξ
′
K) R (ξ
′
J , ξ
′
K).
In this case, we may also say that J is a R-separable. Clearly, separability in J entails
that R is increasing with RJ , that is: for all ξJ , ξ
′
J ∈ XJ and ξK ∈ XK,
if ξJ RJ ξ
′
J , then (ξJ , ξK) R (ξ
′
J , ξK),
and if the RJ -comparison is in fact strict, so is the resulting R-comparison. Conversely, if
RJ is some ordering on XJ , the property that R on X is increasing with RJ entails that R
is weakly separable in J .14
This apparatus can be applied by taking the X` sets to be copies of R, and suitably fixing
the relation R and the indexing sets L and subsets J ⊂ L. For example, for any i ∈ I and
s ∈ S, to translate the statement, “%i induces a conditional preference%is” into a statement
about separability, we take R =%i, L = {(s, o) | s ∈ S, o ∈ O} and J = {(s, o) | o ∈ O} .
All the other “conditional preference” statements introduced in Section 2 can be translated
in the same way. Recall that we assume throughout that conditional preference orderings
exist across the uncertainty type or not at all (i.e., for all s or none, etc). It then follows
14For these definitions and basic facts, see Fishburn (1970), Keeny and Raiffa (1976), and Wakker (1989).
What is called separable here is sometimes called weakly separable elsewhere.
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from the equivalence between separability and the increasing property just said that our
decision-theoretic assumptions could be restated in terms of dominance. For example,
the statement “%i induces conditional preferences %is” is equivalent to asserting that %i
satisfies dominance with respect to the (%is)s∈S .
Let X specifically be an open box in RL, i.e., X = ∏`∈LX`, where the X` are open
intervals. An ordering  on X has an additive representation if it is represented by a
function U : X−→R of the form
U(x) :=
∑
`∈L
u`(x`), (A1)
where u` : X `−→R, ` ∈ L.
Let us say that J ⊆ L is strictly -essential if, for all x ∈ X , there exist y,y′ ∈ X such
that (y`)`∈K = (y′`)`∈K = (x`)`∈K, and y  y′. In words, we can create a strict preference by
only manipulating the J coordinates, while keeping the K coordinates fixed at given values.
We now record two classic results due to Gorman (1968) and Debreu (1960), respectively.
If every subset J ⊆ L is -separable, we say that  is totally separable.
Lemma A1 Let  be a continuous order on an open box X ⊆ RL. Let J ,K ⊆ L be two
-separable subsets of indexes, such that J ∩ K 6= ∅. Suppose that J , K, and J ∩ K are
all strictly -essential. Then:
(a) J ∪ K is -separable.
(b) J ∩ K is -separable.
Lemma A2 If  is a continuous, totally separable order on an open box X ⊆ RL, and
 is increasing in every coordinate, then  has an additive utility representation (A1).
Furthermore, the functions {u`}`∈L in this representation are unique up to positive affine
transformations (PAT) with a common multiplier.
We will now adapt these results to our framework. Suppose L = I × S × O, and let
 be a preference order on X = RL. For any i ∈ I, we will say that  is separable in i if
{i} × S ×O is -separable. Likewise, for any s ∈ S (resp. o ∈ O), say  is separable in s
(resp. separable in o) if I × {s} × O (resp. I × S × {o}) is -separable.
Proposition A3 Take L = I × S × O, with |I| , |S| , |O| ≥ 2, and X = RL, viewing
elements X ∈ X as arrays [xiso]i∈Is∈S,o∈O. If a continuous order  on X is increasing in
every coordinate, and is separable in each i ∈ I, each s ∈ S, and each o ∈ O, then it
admits an additive utility representation U : X−→R of the form
U(x) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
uiso(x
i
so),
where each uiso is a continuous, increasing function from R to R. Furthermore, the utility
functions {uiso}i∈Is∈S,o∈O are unique up to PAT with a common multiplier.
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Proof. (Sketch)
Since  is increasing in every coordinate, every subset of L is strictly -essential. For
all i ∈ I, s ∈ S, and o ∈ O, the subsets {i} × S × O, I × {s} × O, and I × S × {o} are
-separable, by hypothesis. Thus, Lemma A1 says that the (nonempty) intersections of
these sets are -separable, as are their unions. At this point, by further applications of
Lemma A1, we can show that every two-element subset of L is -separable; from there, it
can be shown that every subset of L is -separable. In other words,  is totally separable.
By hypothesis,  is increasing in every coordinate. Thus, we can apply Lemma A2 to get
the additive representation. 
We now specialize the basic sets differently. Take L = J × K with |J |, |K| ≥ 2, and
X = RL, viewing elements X ∈ X as matrices [xjk]j∈Jk∈K, with j ∈ J indexing the rows and
k ∈ K indexing the columns. Alternatively, we can think of X as a J -indexed array of row
vectors xj := [xjk]k∈K ∈ RK, or as a K-indexed array of columns vectors xk := [xjk]j∈J ∈ RJ .
Now consider a continuous ordering  on X . Here are three axioms that  might satisfy.
Coordinate Monotonicity: For all X,Y ∈ X , if xjk ≥ yjk for all (j, k) ∈ J × K, then
X  Y. If, in addition, xjk > yjk for some (j, k) ∈ J ×K, then X  Y.
Row Preferences: For each column j ∈ J ,  is separable in {j} × K.
Column Preferences: For all rows k ∈ K,  is separable in J × {k}.
Define j and k to be the conditional relations of  on j and k, respectively. It follows
from Row Preferences that the j are orders on RK, and from Column Preferences that the
k are orders on RJ . Moreover,  is increasing with respect to each of these conditional
relations . The next two axioms force the conditional orders to be invariant.
Invariant Row Preferences: Row Preferences holds, and there is an ordering J on YK
such that j=J for all j ∈ J .
Invariant Column Preferences: Column Preferences holds, and there is an ordering K on
YJ such that k= K for all k ∈ K.
These five axioms draw their use from the following proposition, which the proofs in
Appendix B will repeatedly use. (Each of these proofs will involve two of the sets I, S, O
taking the place of the abstract indexing sets J and K.)
Proposition A4 (a) Suppose a continuous preference order  on X = RL satisfies Co-
ordinate Monotonicity, Row Preferences and Invariant Column Preferences. Then there
is a strictly positive probability vector p ∈ ∆K, and for all j ∈ J , there is an in-
creasing, continuous function uj : R −→R, such that  is represented by the function
W : X−→R defined by:
W (X) :=
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈J
pk u
j(xjk).
In this representation, the probability vector p is unique, and the functions uj are
unique up to PAT with a common multiplier.
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(b) Assume Invariant Row Preferences instead of Row Preferences, holding the other con-
ditions the same as in part (a) . Then there is an increasing, continuous function
u : R −→ R and strictly positive probability vectors q ∈ ∆J and p ∈ ∆K such that 
is represented by the function W : X −→ R defined by
W (X) :=
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈J
qj pk u(x
j
k).
In this representation, the probability vectors q and p are unique, and the function
u is unique up to a PAT.
Proof. See Mongin and Pivato (2015). Part (a) follows from Theorem 1(c,d), and part (b)
from Corollary 1(c,d). The axioms of that paper are stated differently, because the domain
considered there is not necessarily a Cartesian product. 
Appendix B: Proofs of the results of the paper
Our twofold uncertainty framework may seem to raise the worrying possibility that condi-
tional orderings depend on how they are induced; e.g., that %so, as directly induced by %,
differs from %so, as induced by the ordering %s induced by %, or from %so, as induced by
the ordering %o. However, such a discrepancy cannot occur; the different forms of condi-
tionalization “commute” with one another . We skip the purely formal proof. In the next
lemma and elsewhere, we will repeatedly use this commutativity of conditionalization.
Lemma B1 Let  be a continuous order on RI×S×O.
(a) If  induces interim preferences s and o, then it also induces ex post preferences
so.
(b) If, moreover, the interim preferences o are invariant, then for any given s, s induces
invariant ex post preferences so.
(c) If, moreover, the interim preferences o and s are both invariant, then the ex post
preferences so are invariant.
Proof. Let (s, o) ∈ S ×O. For all o ∈ O, let Jo := {(i′, s′, o); i′ ∈ I and s′ ∈ S}. Then Jo
is a -separable subset of I×S×O, because, by hypothesis,  induces interim preferences
o. Similarly, for all s ∈ S, let Ks := {(i′, s, o′); i′ ∈ I and o′ ∈ O}; this is a -separable
subset of I×S×O, because  induces interim preferences s. The nonempty intersection
Iso := Jo∩Ks is -separable by Lemma A1(b), meaning that  induces ex post preferences
so.
Adding the assumption that the interim preferences o induced by  are invariant, we
fix s and consider any pair o 6= o′. By commutativity of conditonalization , we can regard
the ex post preferences so and so′ as being induced by o and o′ , respectively. But
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o=o′ , so that so=so′ , and now regarding these ex post preferences as being induced
by s , we conclude that this ordering induces invariant ex post preferences.
Now we add the assumption that the interim preferences s induced by  are invariant,
fix o and consider any pair s 6= s′. By symmetric reasoning, we conclude that so=s′o.
The two paragraphs together prove that, for all o, o′ ∈ O and s, s′ ∈ S, so=s′o′ , meaning
that  induces invariant ex post preferences. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let J := S and K := O. We will check which of the axioms of
Appendix A apply to the ordering i, for any i ∈ I . Coordinate Monotonicity holds because
i induces preference orderings iso that coincide with the natural ordering of real numbers.
As the is (resp. the io) are invariant, Invariant Row Preferences (resp. Invariant Column
Preferences) holds. Thus, Proposition A4(b) yields the expected utility representation (2)
for i. Since  has a numerical representation that is increasing with the i by the ex
ante Pareto principle, the social representation (3) follows. The uniqueness condition for
F is obvious, and the other uniqueness statements follow from Proposition A4(b). 
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma B1(c), the assumption that  induces invariant interim
preferences of both kinds guarantees that  also induces invariant ex post preferences xp
on RI . These preferences inherit the continuity of  and the ex post Pareto principle makes
them increasing in every coordinate. Thus, each of them is represented by a continuous
and increasing function v : RI −→ R.
To any X ∈ RI×S×O, we associate the element X˜ ∈ RS×O whose (s, o) component is
x˜so := v(xso). The function V : RI×S×O → RS×O defined by V (X) := X˜ is continuous and
increasing in each component. By these two properties, the image set X˜ := V (RI×S×O) is
a set of the form YS×O, where Y := v(RI) is an open interval.
Define an ordering ˜ on X˜ by the condition that for all X˜, Y˜ ∈ X˜ , if X˜ = V (X) and
Y˜ = V (Y), then
X˜ ˜ Y˜ if and only if X  Y. (B1)
(To see that ˜ is mathematically well-defined by (B1), suppose V (X) = X˜ = V (X′)
for some X,X′ ∈ X . Then for all (s, o) ∈ S × O, we have v(xso) = v(x′so), and hence
xso ≈xp x′so. Thus X ≈ X′, because  is increasing relative to xp.) In terms of the
Appendix A, putting J := S and K := O, we conclude that ˜ is continuous and satisfies
Invariant Row Preferences and Invariant Column Preferences, and Coordinate Monotonicity,
by using the respective properties that  is continuous, induces invariant interim orderings
s, and induces invariant interim orderings o, and induces invariant ex post orderings
xp . Thus, Proposition A4(b) yields strictly positive probability vectors p ∈ ∆S and
q ∈ ∆O, and a continuous increasing function u : R −→ R, such that ˜ is represented by
the function W˜ : X˜ −→ R defined by
W˜ (X˜) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
qo ps u(x˜so).
Now, putting Wxa(X) := W˜ ◦ V (X) for all X ∈ RI×S×O, and Wxp(x) := u ◦ v(x) for all
x ∈ RI , we obtain the desired representations. The uniqueness properties are those of
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Proposition A4(b).15 
Proof of Theorem 3. First we show that  is increasing in every coordinate. Let (i, s, o) ∈
I×S×O. The representation (2) from Proposition 1 implies that the individual preference
order i is increasing with respect to the coordinate xs,o. Since  increasing with respect
to i by the ex ante Pareto principle, we conclude that  is increasing with respect to the
coordinate xis,o.
As the i relations are orderings and the ex ante Pareto principle makes  increasing
with them,  is separable in each i ∈ I. As  induces interim preferences of both types,
 is also separable in each s ∈ S and o ∈ O. It then follows from Proposition A3 that,
for all (i, s, o) ∈ I × S ×O, there exist continuous and increasing functions uiso : R −→ R
such that  is represented by the function Wxa : RI×S×O −→ R defined by
Wxa (X) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
uiso(x
i
so). (B2)
Furthermore, the uiso are unique up to positive affine transformations (PAT) with a common
multiplier. We can fix any Y ∈ RI×S×O and add constants to these functions so as to ensure
that uiso(y
i
so) = 0 for all (i, s, o) ∈ I × S × O.16 For convenience, fix some y ∈ R, and
suppose that yiso = y for all (i, s, o) ∈ I × S ×O.
For all i ∈ I, equation (B2) implies that the preference ordering i can be represented
by the function U i : RS×O −→ R defined by
U i(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
uiso(xso) . (B3)
From Proposition 1 , there are continuous increasing utility functions u˜i : R −→ R, and
two strictly positive probability vectors pi ∈ ∆S and qi ∈ ∆O, such that i is represented
by the function U i : RS×O −→ R defined by
U i(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
qio p
i
s u˜
i(xso). (B4)
Furthermore, in this representation, pi and qi are unique, and u˜i is unique up to PAT. By
adding a constant, we ensure that u˜i(y) = 0.
From the uniqueness property applied to (B3) and (B4), there exist constants αi > 0
and βi ∈ R such that :
uiso(x) = α
i qio p
i
s u˜
i(x) + βi, for all (s, o) ∈ S ×O. (B5)
Substituting x = y into (B5) leads to βi = 0. Then substituting (B5) (for all i ∈ I) into
the representation (B2) yields:
Wxa (X) =
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
αi qio p
i
s u˜
i(xiso). (B6)
15Proposition A4(b) is stated for RJ×K , but it carries through to subsets Y J×K ⊆ RJ×K, when these
are open and take the form of a product of intervals.
16To avoid burdening notation, we refer to the original and translated functions by the same symbol.
This convention is applied throughout the proofs.
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For given s ∈ S in this representation, we obtain a representation Vs : RI×O −→ R of the
interim preference s on RI×O :
Vs(X) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
αi qio p
i
s u˜
i(xio). (B7)
Let Ys := (y, . . . , y) ∈ RI×O; then Vs(Ys) = 0.
Let us now put J := I and K := O, and check which axioms in Appendix A the interim
preference s satisfies. This is a continuous ordering by the continuity of . By the repre-
sentation (B7) , s is separable in each {i}×O and each I × {o}, and increasing in every
coordinate , and thus satisfies Row Preferences, Column Preferences, and Coordinate Mono-
tonicity . As  induces invariant o, Lemma B1(b) entails that the induced preferences
so are invariant, meaning that the stronger axiom of Invariant Column Preferences holds.
Hence, Proposition A4(a) yields a strictly positive probability vector rs ∈ ∆O, and for all
i ∈ I, continuous, increasing utility functions ûis : R −→ R such that s is represented by
the function V̂s : RI×O −→ R defined by
V̂s(X) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
rso û
i
s(x
i
o). (B8)
In this representation, rs is unique and the functions û
i
s are unique up to PAT with a
common multiplier. We add constants to ensure that ûis(y) = 0 for all i ∈ I. It follows
that V̂s(Ys) = 0.
From the uniqueness property applied to (B7) and (B8), there exist γs > 0 and δs ∈ R
such that V̂s = γs Vs + δs. Substituting Ys leads to δs = 0. Since this holds for all s ∈ S,
we can conclude that
γs rso û
i
s = α
i qio p
i
s u˜
i, for all (i, s, o) ∈ I × S ×O (B9)
Let us now fix i and s in these equations. All the coefficients are positive and the increasing
functions ûis and u˜
i are nonzero for some y∗ ∈ R. Thus we can derive the relations:
rso
qio
=
αi pis u˜
i(y∗)
γs û
i
s(y
∗)
, for all o ∈ O. (B10)
The right-hand side of (B10) does not depend on o. Thus, the left-hand side must also
be independent of o, which means that the vectors qi and rs are scalar multiples of one
another. Thus, since they are probability vectors, we have qi = rs. Since this holds for all i
and s, we can drop the indexes. Denote the common probability vector by q. Substituting
q into (B6) and defining ui := αi u˜i, we get the formula (5) of the theorem. The other
parts readily follow. 
Proof of Theorem 4. For each i ∈ I, i satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 1. Thus,
by the argument used to prove this proposition, we conclude that there exist a continuous
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increasing utility function ui : R −→ R, and strictly positive probability vectors pi ∈ ∆S
and qi ∈ ∆O, such that i is represented by the function U i : RS×O −→ R defined by
U i(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
qio p
i
s u
i(xso),
and the ui are unique up to PAT with a common multiplier. This establishes the SEU
representation (6). Fix x ∈ R. By adding constants, we ensure that ui(x) = 0 for all i ∈ I.
Meanwhile, Proposition 2 yields strictly positive probability vectors p ∈ ∆S and q ∈
∆O, and a continuous increasing function Wxp : RI −→ R, such that  is represented by
the function Wxa : X −→ R defined by
Wxa(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
ps qoWxp(xso),
where p and q are unique, and Wxp is unique up to PAT. This establishes the SEU repre-
sentation (7). Let x := (x, . . . , x). By adding a constant, we ensure that Wxp(x) = 0.
Now let J = I and K = O and consider how the axioms of Appendix A apply to
s for any given s ∈ S, recalling that these interim social preferences are well-defined
and invariant (i.e. independent of s) . The objective interim Pareto principle makes s
separable in each i ∈ I, so that Row Preferences holds. By Proposition 2, the ex post
social preferences so are well-defined and invariant, so that Invariant Column Preferences
holds. Then, by Proposition A4(a), there exist a probability vector q˜ ∈ ∆O, and for all
i ∈ I, continuous increasing functions vi such that s is represented by the function
W : RI×O −→ R defined by
W (X) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
q˜o v
i(xiso),
where q˜ is unique and the vi are unique up to PAT with a common multiplier. The same
representation holds for all s ∈ S. Adding a constant, we ensure that vi(x) = 0 for all
i ∈ I.
We now show that q = q˜. By fixing s ∈ S and applying the representation Wxa
to elements X whose components for s′ 6= s are fixed at some values, we obtain a new
representation for s and reduce it to the representation just obtained in terms of W by
the standard uniqueness property. That is, there exist constants α > 0 and β such that∑
o∈O
qoWxp(xo) = α
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
q˜o v
i(xio) + β for all X ∈ RI×O.
Substituting xio = x for all i ∈ I and o ∈ O leads to β = 0. Now fixing o and putting
xio′ = x for all o
′ 6= o leads to the equation:
Wxp(xo) =
q˜o
qo
∑
i∈I
α vi(xiso), for all xo ∈ RI .
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Since this holds for all o ∈ O, the two probability vectors q and q˜ are proportional, hence
equal. Hence
Wxp(xo) =
∑
i∈I
α vi(xiso), for all xo ∈ RI . (B11)
and the invariant conditional preference s is represented by the function W˜ : RI×O −→ R
defined by
W˜ (X) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
qo α v
i(xiso).
We now use a similar argument to show that q = qi for all i ∈ I. Fixing i ∈ I and
s ∈ S, we can obtain a representation for is in two ways, i.e., first from W˜ by applying
this representation to elements of RI×O whose components for i′ 6= i are fixed at some
values, and second, from U i by applying this representation to elements of RS×O whose
components for s′ 6= s are fixed at some values. By the standard uniqueness property,
there exist γis > 0 and δ
i
s such that∑
o∈O
qoαv
i(xo) = γ
i
s
∑
o∈O
qio p
i
s u
i(xo) + δ
i
s, for all x ∈ RO. (B12)
Substituting xo = x into (B12) leads to δ
i
s = 0. Fix o ∈ O. Put xo′ = x for all o′ 6= o leads
to the equation:
qo
qio
αvi(x) = γis p
i
s u
i(x) for all x ∈ R . (B13)
The right-hand side of (B13) is independent of o. Thus, the probability vectors q and qi
are proportional, hence equal, and thus
αvi(x) = γis p
i
s u
i(x) for all x ∈ R. (B14)
Equation (B14) holds for all s ∈ S. Hence, for all i ∈ I, the product ri := γis pis is
independent of s; note that ri > 0. Equation (B14) now says αvi = ri ui. Substituting
this into the representation (B11) yields the representation (8) for xp. This completes
the proof. 
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